(a message from DFNYC member Michael Minn)

Philip Taubman's excellent article in the November 11, 2007 edition of the NY Times, Death of Spy Satellite Program is a nightmare story of a complex, fabulously-expensive military engineering project gone horribly awry - almost from day one.

It is also a story of how conservative governing philosophy can, ironically, spend more money to buy less security.

In 1996, a commission created by the Clinton Administration's CIA director made recommendations on how the nation's spy satellite systems could better address the more varied and elusive threats that had emerged in the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union. While the existing, Cold-War-oriented system was built around a small number of large, complex and hugely expensive satellites, the commission proposed deployment of a large number of smaller, less-expensive reconnaissance satellites that would more frequently fly over locations of interest. The smaller satellites would also be cheaper to launch than the large satellites that required larger, more-expensive and less-reliable rockets to place them in orbit. Discussion and proposals were made for the secret project over the next three years and in 1999 the National Reconnaissance Office awarded a contract to Boeing for two different satellite designs (electro-optical and radar-imaging) as part of the Future Imagery Architecture (FIA).

The problems began began almost immediately. Boeing had never built these types of spy satellites before and did not have the expertise to either create a reality-based proposal or execute that proposal on time or within budget. The original design of the optical system proved impossible to implement. Critical components had significant design flaws or were defective when delivered by subcontractors. Optimistic design decisions made to reduce costs often resulted in increased costs when design flaws forced redesign. Delays lead to budget overruns.

By the time the electro-optical part of the project was canceled in September of 2005, the project had exceeded the original spending limits by $8 billion. The first radar-imaging satellite is expected to be delivered in 2009, four years behind schedule. Lockheed-Martin (a company with considerable spy satellite expertise), was subsequently awarded a contract for an updated model of it's current electro-optical satellite, with first delivery also scheduled for 2009. Meanwhile, our security and intelligence capability continues to depend on a fragile, aging satellite fleet.

Although Taubman's piece is not overtly political and goes out of its way to detail the multiple levels of failure, core pillars of conservatism (executed by both parties) figured prominently in this debacle:

• Cutting Spending: In authorizing the project, the conservative-dominated Congress established a cap of $5 billion for the first five years with spending limited to $1 billion per year. While providing for financing of unexpected costs, the contract discouraged overruns and delays with financial penalties. Given the technical complexity of the plan, the only contractor that was willing to commit to such a project was Boeing, who lacked the satellite experience of Lockheed that was needed to realize that the demands were unrealistic. With the business threat posed by Airbus in the commercial airliner business, Boeing was trying to diversify and made an overly-optimistic proposal in order to get the FIA contract. Concerns were stifled because of the penalties associated with delays. The ultimate result was more spending for worse results.
• Smaller Government: In keeping with the Clinton Administration's conservative-inspired push to downsize the federal government, control of big military projects was transferred to contractors under the philosophy that the private sector could better manage engineering work and control costs. But because of Boeing's lack of satellite expertise, they were unprepared to deliver realistic reports on the progress of the FIA project and address the fatal problems that emerged. Even worse, the outsourcing resulted in a brain drain of officers leaving the Air Force satellite projects and National Reconnaissance Office and dulling the government's ability to prevent such problems in the future.
• Government is the Problem: The Times piece quotes Missouri Republican Senator and Intelligence Committee vice chairman Christopher "Kit" Bond on the program, "It's fair to say we have lost double-digit billions on satellite programs that weren't effectively managed by the government." While this quote fits nicely into the long-standing conservative frame about how government is naturally incompetent, it also cleverly diverts attention from the reality that this particular project was being managed by a private contractor. And that contractor was selected by a government being run by conservatives. A little more un-outsourced oversight and realistic funding would probably have made a significant difference in the direction and outcome of the FIA project.
• Powerful Military-Industrial Complex: Government reviews from the beginning of the project raised red flags and a 2003 review of the FIA project and other failing military space programs reported that the project, "was not executable." However, the funding kept flowing for two more years because of support from the Bush Administration and powerful Congressional backers, including powerful conservative Democrat Jane Harmon, whose Southern California district contained the Boeing assembly facility for the FIA satellites.

As with the recent Time Magazine article on the deadly horrors of the V-22 Osprey project, Taubman's piece is gripping reading and, to some extent, a progressive call to arms. The solutions needed to reduce the chance for such debacles in the future are complex and far from clear. However, implementation of a more rational system for financing campaigns (to blunt the overwhelming influence of defense contractors) and election of representatives with a realistic view of what it takes to fund and run a strong military and competent government would be a good start.